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WAIT, WHO ARE WE TALKING ABOUT HERE?
SEARCHING FOR A CONSISTENT APPROACH
TO APPLYING RFRA TO CORPORATIONS
STEVEN J. HARRISON*
INTRODUCTION
There is perhaps no idea in contemporary American law that is
more publicly contentious than that of “corporate personhood.”1  Of
all of the Supreme Court cases dealing with corporations and the cor-
porate entity, few probably thought that a decision could surpass Citi-
zens United2 in public controversy and divisiveness produced by the
decision,3 which brought the legal fiction of the “corporate person” to
the forefront of popular debate and discussion.4  Then came Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,5 which not only addressed whether corporations
could “act” in a manner that seemed only a possibility for “real” or “nat-
ural” persons, which recalled the contentious question in Citizens
United, but did so in the context of religious liberty and women’s repro-
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2017; Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science, Wheaton College 2014.  I would like to thank Professor Rick Garnett for
his guidance and input and also my undergraduate Professor and mentor at Wheaton
College Dr. Bryan McGraw, with whom I first engaged with this topic.  I would also like to
thank the members of the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy for their work in
perfecting this Note. S. D. G.
1. See Margaret M. Blair, Corporate Personhood and the Corporate Persona, 2013 U. ILL.
L. REV. 785 (2013).  As Blair notes, the thorny issue of how to understand the corpora-
tion, if anything more than the sum of its parts, is by no means a purely modern question
or purely modern phenomenon.
2. Citizens United v. Fed.Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3. See, e.g., Kyle Langvardt, Imagining Change Before and After Citizens United, 3 ALA.
C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 227 (2012); Roger M. Michalski, Rights Come with Responsibilities: Per-
sonal Jurisdiction in the Age of Corporate Personhood, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 125 (2013);
Ganesh Sitaraman, Essay, Contracting Around Citizens United, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 755
(2014); Deborah Hellman, Defining Corruption and Constitutionalizing Democracy, 111 MICH.
L. REV. 1385 (2013).
4. See, e.g., Nina Totenberg, When Did Corporations Become People?  Excavating the Legal
Evolution, NPR (July 28, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/07/28/335288388/when-did-
companies-become-people-excavating-the-legal-evolution; Kent Greenfield, If Corporations
Are People, They Should Act like It, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 1, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com
/politics/archive/2015/02/if-corporations-are-people-they-should-act-like-it/385034/;
Adam Winkler, Corporations Are People, and They Have More Rights Than You, HuffPost Polit-
ics, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-wink
ler/corporations-are-people-a_b_5543833.html; Kent Greenfield, Let Us Now Praise Corpo-
rate Persons, WASH. MONTHLY (Jan./Feb. 2015), http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/mag
azine/januaryfebruary_2015/features/let_us_now_praise_corporate_pe053466.php?page
=sll.
5. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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ductive rights, both of which tend toward controversy.6  What could
possibly go wrong?  Unsurprisingly, the case is generally reviled by those
who can be overly generalized as “the Left”7 and praised by those who
can likewise be overly generalized as “the Right.”8  The Hobby Lobby case
was so contentious precisely because it was reflective of a number of
larger concerns in the popular American psyche—fear of corporate
personhood,9 the impact of religious freedom claims in an era of
expanding reproductive rights for women10 (and the impact of the lat-
ter, and other progressive social movements, on the former),11 and the
ability of religiously affiliated individuals and institutions to exist and
navigate within a cultural atmosphere, which is progressively more hos-
tile to the views of conservative and traditional institutions.12
In addition to frustration over the ultimate outcome reached by
the Court, there has been much commentary on the reasoning underly-
ing the Hobby Lobby decision and its future implications.13  The line of
reasoning that the Court took in Hobby Lobby is the concern of this
Note.  The general outline of the majority’s argument in Hobby Lobby
follows several steps: first, based on principles of interpretation, RFRA
applies to the closely held corporations that were before the Court.14
Therefore, the religious burdens claimed by the plaintiffs must survive
the “compelling government interest” and “least restrictive means” test
re-instated by RFRA, if in fact the burden was determined to be substan-
6. See, e.g., Robin Abcarian, Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby Decision is a Slap in the Face to
Women, L.A. TIMES (June 30, 2014), http://www.la times. com/nation/la-me-ra-hobby-
lobby-scotus-20140630-column.html; Carey Lodge, Hobby Lobby President: ‘Christians Must
Fight for Religious Freedom in America,’ CHRISTIAN TODAY (Sept. 16, 2014), http://
www.christiantoday.com/article/hobby.lobby.president.christians.must.fight.for.religious.
freedom.in.america/40675.htm.  I cite these articles more for the headlines as they exem-
plify the intensity with which people attack and defend either side of the debate.  They
illustrate the “us-versus-them,” binary, zero-sum thinking that is often employed in this
conversation.
7. See, e.g., Leah Rutman, The Hobby Lobby Decision: Imposing Religious Beliefs on
Employees, AM. C.L. UNION (Aug. 11, 2014), https://aclu-wa.org/blog/hobby-lobby-deci
sion-imposing-religious-beliefs-employees.
8. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Marshall & Sarah Torre, RFRA Worked the Way it was Supposed
to in Hobby Lobby, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (July 8, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/
research/commentary/2014/7/rfra-worked-the-way-it-was-supposed-to-in-hobby-lobby.  I
could hang a long list of sources in this and the above footnote, but I believe everyone has
already experienced the truth of the proposition without an excess of citations.
9. See generally Winkler, supra note 4.
10. See, e.g., Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22
AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 303 (2013–14).
11. See Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014–15).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g.,Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70
BUS. LAW. 1 (2014–15); Elizabeth Sepper, Reports of Accommodation’s Death Have Been
Greatly Exaggerated, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 24 (2014–2015); Alex J. Luchenitser, A New Era of
Inequality? Hobby Lobby and Religious Exemptions from Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 HARV.L.
& POL’Y REV. 63 (2015); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious
Exemptions, 38 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 35 (2015); Frederick Mark Gedicks, One Cheer for
Hobby Lobby: Improbable Alternatives, Truly Strict Scrutiny, and Third-Party Employee Burdens,
38 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 153 (2015).
14. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
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tial, as it was.15  This line of reasoning, however, raises several ques-
tions.  The first of which is, if we begin with the proposition that the
corporation, for purposes of the law, is, in fact, a person, how can we
coherently talk about the “corporate person” exercising religion?  And,
supposing that we can, how are courts supposed to determine whether
such “religious exercise” has in fact been burdened?  Corporations can-
not visit houses of worship, confess common creeds, or practice relig-
ious rites, all of which come to mind when we consider the phrase
“exercise of religion.”  What precisely does it mean when a court pro-
claims that a burden has been imposed on a corporation vis–à–vis its
exercise of religion?  And if, somehow, the corporation can meaning-
fully exercise religion, what standard is used to determine the substanti-
ality of the claimed burden?  Against what baseline is the “heaviness” of
the purported burden to be measured?  Or is the “religious burden”
that we are considering simply that which is imposed on the individual?
To sum these questions into a single difficulty, how are burdens on the
“religious exercise” of a corporation to be conceptualized and mea-
sured?  This is the question to which this Note is devoted to answering.
In this Note, I will argue that a new approach is needed for analyz-
ing RFRA claims involving corporate persons.  In order to make this
argument, I will first detail the history leading up to the Hobby Lobby
decision, including both the Smith case and the passage of RFRA.  Then
I will analyze the Hobby Lobby case itself, and thereafter present my argu-
ment that the majority’s analysis of religious burdens of “corporate per-
sons” does not adequately distinguish whose religious exercise is in
question and who exactly is the person burdened.  I will then give a
quick overview of the history of the corporation in the United States,
and show how this history provides us with an understanding of the
proper background against which to measure the substantiality of bur-
dens imposed on corporations.  Finally, with this understanding, I will
outline a three-part test for determining if a substantial burden has
been imposed upon a “corporate person.”  By making the test for “cor-
porate persons” analytically distinct from that which is utilized in RFRA
claims for natural persons, I believe my test will protect the religious
rights of individuals as contemplated by the RFRA statute and provide
an analysis rigorous enough to ensure both that the state will not have
its ability to pass public welfare legislation hamstrung, and that corpora-
tions will not be able to escape the effects of legislation which their
board of directors, or other controlling group, would simply rather
avoid.
I. THE PATH TO Hobby Lobby: Employment Division v. Smith and RFRA
In order to understand the current questions surrounding Hobby
Lobby, it is necessary to first turn back to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Employment Division v. Smith.16  While the history of the Smith case is
15. Id. at 2780–82.
16. Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon .v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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well known, and has been written about extensively,17 a brief outline of
the case will be helpful in understanding the background against which
it was decided.  In order to provide this background, I will briefly
describe both the Smith case and Congress’s response to that decision:
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act.18  This quick background of
the well-known development in the law of religious exemptions will be
helpful in understanding the context of the Hobby Lobby case, particu-
larly the back-and-forth between the Supreme Court and Congress over
the issue of the proper role of the religious exemption.
A. Employment Division v. Smith and Its Impact
The first major development that concerns us is the Court’s deci-
sion in Employment Division v. Smith.19  Prior to the decision, the Court
had long held that religious exemptions could be judicially imposed in
cases where generally applicable laws imposed religious burdens on
plaintiffs that were not “justified by a compelling state interest.”20  This
regime, however, was altered by Smith; the Smith case involved the relig-
ious use of peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, which was proscribed by Ore-
gon’s controlled substances statute.21  After two individuals were
denied unemployment benefits on the grounds they had been fired for
ingesting the drug, they brought suit, claiming the denial of unemploy-
ment benefits was in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.22  The plain-
tiffs relied on Sherbert and its “compelling government interest” test.23
In considering whether the Sherbert test ought to be applied in the case,
the Court came to the following conclusion:
We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach
in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the
test inapplicable to such challenges.  The government’s ability to
enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful con-
duct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy,
“cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental
action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.”  To make
an individual’s obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the
law’s coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the
State’s interest is “compelling”-permitting him, by virtue of his
17. See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett, The Political (and Other) Safeguards of Religious Free-
dom, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1815 (2011); Ira C. Lupu, Employment Division v. Smith and the
Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU  L. REV. 259 (1993); Marci A. Hamilton,
Employment Division v. Smith at the Supreme Court: The Justices, the Litigants, and the Doctri-
nal Discourse, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1671 (2010–11).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
19. 494 U.S. 872.
20. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 400, 403 (1963); See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972).
21. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
22. Id. at 874–75.
23. Id. at 876, 883 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403).
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beliefs, “to become a law unto himself,”-contradicts both constitu-
tional tradition and common sense.24
The Court feared that a contrary position would deprive the govern-
ment of its ability to engage in any number of different types of social
welfare legislation, as many of the regulatory schemes set up to achieve
social goods inevitably end up conflicting with the conscience claims of
those on whom the regulatory scheme imposes burdens or obliga-
tions.25  Consequently, the Smith Court reasoned that a position con-
trary to the one it had taken would risk that these essential pieces of
social welfare legislation and regulatory schemes could die the death of
a thousand qualifications as a result:
The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitu-
tionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of
almost every conceivable kind-ranging from compulsory military
service, to the payment of taxes, to health and safety regulation
such as manslaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory vaccina-
tion laws, drug laws, and traffic laws; to social welfare legislation
such as minimum wage laws, child labor laws, animal cruelty laws,
environmental protection laws, and laws providing for equality of
opportunity for the races.26
Having utilized this parade of horribles to emphasize the risks the
majority’s conclusion avoids, the Smith Court announced the death of
the Sherbert test.  This meant that plaintiffs could no longer have a
potential refuge in court-created religious exemptions to generally
applicable laws, as the handling of accommodations were being left “to
the political process.”27
Central to the Smith decision—and to the Court’s understanding of
the implications of the plaintiffs’ position in the case—is the fear that
granting individuals the ability to escape many of the necessary and eve-
ryday actions taken by the government would undercut the govern-
ment’s ability to engage in any type of public welfare legislation, by
shredding the legislative program with religious exemption claims; and
with the religious pluralism of modern (or even 1990) America.  There
were simply too many different types of objections that could be made.
The Court, with Smith, therefore, announced the new rule for religious
exemptions: plaintiffs would no longer have recourse to judicially-cre-
ated religious exemptions stemming from the Free Exercise Clause.
Against the background of Sherbert and Yoder, the Smith decision came as
quite a shock.28  While some argued Smith was a disaster for religious
24. Id. at 885 (quoting Lying v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 108 S. Ct.
1319 (1988)).
25. Which, in a nice bit of foreshadowing, was again the concern voiced by the
dissenters in the Hobby Lobby decision twenty-four years later.
26. Id. at 888 (internal citations omitted).
27. Id. at 890.
28. See David B. Frohnmayer, Employment Division v. Smith:“The Sky that Didn’t
Fall,” 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655, 1655–56 (2010–11) (describing Employment Division v.
Smith as “a landmark case which resulted in a completely unexpected decision by the
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liberty,29 and others attempted to rebut that claim,30 what was indispu-
table was that the era of judicially-granted religious exemptions was
over.
B. Congress Strikes Back: The Passage of RFRA and the
Re-Birth of Sherbert
In the aftermath of Smith, just three years after the Smith decision,
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,31
which was explicitly written to nullify the Smith decision32 and force a
return to the “compelling interest test” employed in Sherbert and
Yoder.33  RFRA made the return to the Sherbert standard explicit: “Gov-
ernment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.”34  With
explicit reference to the Smith language utilized by Justice Scalia, Con-
gress announced that it was not persuaded by the parade of horribles
and that the government would be just fine navigating the Sherbert test
once again.  In eliminating the Smith non-standard, Congress reinsti-
tuted the Sherbert balancing test: “Government may substantially burden
a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of
the burden to the person— (1) is in furtherance of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest.”35  And with RFRA, Congress
made it clear that there was, once again, a regime of religious exemp-
tions from laws which, while not targeting any religious belief or activ-
ity, nevertheless did not pass the strict test originally contemplated by
Sherbert.36  Congress signaled to potential plaintiffs that they would once
again be able to appeal to the judicial branch for relief from laws which,
while facially religion-neutral, nevertheless imposed burdens on the
plaintiffs’ personal religious beliefs.  With religious exemptions back on
the table, as it were, it was only a matter of time before tensions
between religious claims and progressive social cases came to a head,
United States Supreme Court . . . The . . . Smith [case] at [its] inception seemed to be
straightforward unemployment compensation claims with Sherbert v. Verner overtones.”)
29. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1990);
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1109 (1990); in a particularly memorable critique, former New York Congressman Ste-
phen Solarz attacked the Smith decision as a “dastardly and unprovoked attack on our first
freedom.” 137 Cong. Rec. 17,023, 17,035–36 (1991) (statement of Rep. Solarz).
30. See Garnett, supra note 17.
31. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993).
32. Id. at (a)(4).
33. Id. at (a)(5).
34. Id. at § 2000bb-1(a) (emphasis added).
35. Id. at § 2000bb-1(b)(1)–(2).
36. It is also interesting to note that the passage of RFRA approached unanimity
and was without any meaningful resistance: it passed the House unanimously through a
voice vote and passed the Senate in a resounding 97-3 vote; in addition, the House bill
had 170 cosponsors, which, excluding one non-voting cosponsor (the Representative
from the District of Columbia), constituted nearly 40 percent of the House (approxi-
mately 38.9 percent). H.R. 1308 - Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/1308.
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and this was realized by the Affordable Care Act and the contraception
mandate.
II. BURWELL V. HOBBY LOBBY STORES, INC.
The facts of the Hobby Lobby case are well known, so I will only pro-
vide a brief sketch of the case.  The lead-up and background to the
case, as everyone no doubt remembers, is set against the background of
the passage of the Affordable Care Act.37  At issue in Hobby Lobby was
the employer mandate, one of the key components of the Act.  The
case centered around two families, the Hahns and the Greens, which
each controlled closely-held corporations: the Hahns controlling Con-
estoga Wood Specialties and the Greens controlling the Hobby Lobby
chain of stores.38  Both families were devout Christians and both strove
to operate their businesses in accordance with those beliefs.39  Both of
these families challenged the Affordable Care Act’s contraceptive man-
date, as they believed that the tenets of Christianity teach that “human
life begins at conception” and that it is therefore, profoundly immoral
to provide for contraceptives which operate after conception.40  For
both families, certain drugs mandated by the ACA and the Department
of Health and Human Services were abortifacients: the functional
equivalent of abortion and, therefore, a profound sin according to their
religion.41  The cases were consolidated and brought before the Court
in 2014, garnering much attention from the media42 and from citi-
zens43 who, quite naturally, viewed themselves as intensely invested in
the outcome of what was certain to become, in one way or another, an
infamous case.
What concerns us the most, at present, with the reasoning in Hobby
Lobby is the Court’s discussion of the burden imposed on the corpora-
tion and, by extension, the plaintiffs.  The Court stated that “[b]y
requiring the Hahns and Greens and their companies to arrange for
such coverage, the HHS mandate demands that they engage in conduct
that seriously violates their religious beliefs.”44  The Court dispensed
37. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010).
38. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764–65 (2014).
39. Id.
40. Id.at 2764.
41. To be more specific, under the Affordable Care Act, employers with at least 50
employees must offer health coverage providing “minimum essential coverage” or pay a
fine.  26 U.S.C. §§ 4980D(a)-(b), 5000A(f)(2).  The statute mandated that such health
care coverage must include “preventative care and screenings,” but did not specify what
types of care fell under that category, instead opting to leave the Health Resources and
Services Administration (HRSA), a subcomponent of the HHS, to define that category.
42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4).  The HRSA then published “Women’s Preventative Services
Guidelines” which provided that employers were to provide coverage for all contraceptive
methods approved by the FDA.  77 Fed. Reg. 8725.
42. See, e.g., Jaime Fuller, Here’s What You Need to Know about the Hobby Lobby Case,
WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2014); Adam Liptak, Court Confronts Religious Rights of Corporations,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2013).
43. See Lawrence Hurley, U.S. Justices Uphold Firms’ Religious Objections to Contracep-
tion, REUTERS (June 30, 2014).
44. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
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with the argument that the corporations at issue were not “persons”
within the meaning of RFRA, saying “[t]he term ‘person’ sometimes
encompasses artificial persons (as the Dictionary Act instructs), and it
sometimes is limited to natural persons,” and because it was admitted
that RFRA covered nonprofit corporations, it could not be argued that
the corporations in this case did not fit the definition.45  From that
point, the Court quickly moves to an analysis of the religious burden
imposed on the plaintiffs:
Because RFRA applies in these cases, we must next ask whether
the HHS contraceptive mandate “substantially burden[s]” the
exercise of religion.  We have little trouble concluding that it
does.As we have noted, the Hahns and Greens have a sincere relig-
ious belief that life begins at conception.  They therefore object
on religious grounds to providing health insurance that covers
methods of birth control that, as HHS acknowledges, may result in
the destruction of an embryo.  By requiring the Hahns and
Greens and their companies to arrange for such coverage, the
HHS mandate demands that they engage in conduct that seriously
violates their religious beliefs.46
From this point, it was not difficult for the Court to reach its conclu-
sion, as the Court noted that the sums the corporations would have to
pay were indeed substantial;47 the Court then applied the pre-Smith
standard that RFRA reinstated to find that, regardless of whether the
contraceptive mandate furthered a compelling governmental interest,
the mandate was not the least restrictive means of securing “public
health,” “gender equality,” or “access to all FDA-approved contracep-
tives without cost sharing.”48  Having failed the pre-Smith, Sherbert test,
the contraceptive mandate was struck down as applied to the plaintiffs.
A. Hobby Lobby’s Aftermath
As I noted above, the Hobby Lobby decision did little to quell the
concerns presented by the case,49 and its contentiousness remains.
And it is not the case that the controversies at issue in Hobby Lobby will
only be fought with ink and paper on the law-review article battlefield:
earlier last year, the Court granted certiorari to hear the case of Little
Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Burwell.50  The case has weighty
45. Id. at 2769.  Also, while there was a back-and-forth between the majority and
dissenting opinions on the extent to which RFRA, as modified by RLUIPA, incorporated
and/or expanded pre-Smith free exercise jurisprudence, that discussion is ancillary to the
purposes of this Note, and, therefore, is not addressed. See id.at 2760–62, 2792–93.
46. Id. at 2775.
47. The sums included $475 million per year for Hobby Lobby and $33 million for
Conestoga. Id. at 2775–76.
48. Id. at 2779–84.  The analysis of how the mandate failed the least-restrictive
means test, while of both practical and academic interest and importance, is not of great
significance to furthering the argument presented in this Note.
49. Supra note 13.
50. See 136 S. Ct. 446 (Mem.) (2015).  This case, unsurprisingly, has garnered simi-
lar interest to the Hobby Lobby case. See, e.g., Emma Green, The Little Sisters of the Poor are
Headed to the Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 6, 2015) http://www.theatlantic.com/
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implications for a number of other religiously affiliated institutions
which have also challenged the contraceptive mandate.51  Needless to
say, the controversy will not be limited to academia, but is already still
active in the lower courts and circuit courts around the nation, with the
Supreme Court again set to give new definition to what constitutes a
“substantial” burden in these scenarios.  With that in mind, I will now
attempt to contribute to the conversation by suggesting a new way to
look at the meaning of a burden imposed on a corporation.
B. Analyzing Religious Burdens on Corporations:
Is There a Double Standard?
Returning to the reasoning of the majority in Hobby Lobby, what
might strike readers of the opinion as odd is the fact that while the
“persons” in question are the corporations controlled by the Hahns and
the Greens, and not the Hahns and Greens themselves, the Court,
when analyzing the burden imposed by the ACA on these “persons,”
references the Hahns and Greens individually, and not the corporate
entities.  This reasoning was not lost on Justice Ginsburg who, in her
dissent, articulated the difficulty:
[T]he Court questions why, if “a sole proprietorship that seeks to
make a profit may assert a free-exercise claim, [Hobby Lobby and
Conestoga] can’t . . . do the same?”  But even accepting, arguendo,
the premise that unincorporated business enterprises may gain
religious accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court’s conclusion is unsound.  In a sole proprietorship, the busi-
ness and its owner are one and the same.  By incorporating a busi-
ness, however, an individual separates herself from the entity and
escapes personal responsibility for the entity’s obligations.  One
might ask why the separation should hold only when it serves the
interest of those who control the corporation.52
As I will describe in greater detail below, the plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby, at
least at first, seem to be having their cake and eating it too: they are
able to legally separate themselves from the corporation and therefore
protect their assets (in addition to gaining other benefits).  However,
the plaintiffs seem to breach this bargain in the Hobby Lobby case
because they object, on personal grounds, to activities the government is
politics/archive/2015/11/the-little-sisters-of-the-poor-are-headed-to-the-supreme-court/
414729/.
51. Examples of such institutions include the University of Notre Dame and Whea-
ton College.  Notre Dame, in May of last year, lost its case in the Seventh Circuit after the
Supreme Court remanded the case in light of the Hobby Lobby decision.  Univ. of Notre
Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015).  Wheaton College, after the Supreme
Court granted a temporary injunction to the college, had a lower court’s denial of the
college’s preliminary injunction affirmed by the Seventh Circuit.  Wheaton Coll. v.
Burwell, 792 F.3d 792 (7th Cir. 2015).  The case, currently back in the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, was stayed pending the ruling from the Little Sisters of the
Poor case.  Joint Motion to Stay the Case, Wheaton College v. Burwell, 1:13-cv-08910 (N.
Dist. Ill. 2014).
52. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (internal citations
omitted).
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compelling the corporation to undertake.  But have not the plaintiffs
arranged for a legal separation between themselves and their businesses
via the corporate structure, regardless if the corporation is closely-held?
After all, is not the legal separation between the individual and the cor-
poration the raison d’être of the corporate entity?  How then can they
object in this way?  It does seem, prima facie, that Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent exposes a serious gap in the reasoning of the majority: in the
Court’s opinion, after holding that “a federal regulation’s restriction on
the activities of a for-profit closely held corporation must comply with
RFRA,”53  Justice Alito poses the question of “whether the HHS contra-
ceptive mandate ‘substantially burden[s]’ the exercise of religion”54
(emphasis added).  Notice whose exercise is not specified.  Then, in the
next paragraph, the Court states “[a]s we have noted, the Hahns and
Greens have a sincere religious belief that life begins at conception.
They therefore object on religious grounds to providing health insur-
ance . . . . By requiring the Hahns and Greens and their companies to
arrange for such coverage, the HHS mandate demands that they
engage in conduct that seriously violates their religious beliefs.”55  We
can see that the Court’s opinion seems to make an unjustified leap
from the rights of the corporations in question to the beliefs of the
flesh and blood persons in the case.  The use of the pronoun “they” in
the above section from the Court’s opinion illustrates the apparent
blending of identity: exactly whose religious exercise are we talking
about here?  And who is the “person” whose burden we are analyzing:
the families’ or the corporations’?  In the above section, the Court
seems to give one answer, then the other, and then both.  This issue
becomes especially pronounced as the Court is set to hear another case
addressing the same issue of religious burdens in the corporate context.
Is there a way to solve this confusion of identities?
III. A MODEST PROPOSAL: A NEW APPROACH TO ANALYZING BURDENS
ON CORPORATIONS’ “RELIGIOUS EXERCISE”
I believe that there is a solution to the apparent inconsistency and
confusion of persons by the Hobby Lobby Court.  In order to present my
solution, I will very briefly give a history of the development of the cor-
poration’s relationship to the state, and compare that understanding to
the relationship between the individual and the state.  From there, I will
use that understanding to outline my approach for analyzing such
cases, which culminates in a three-part test that, in addition to produc-
ing just outcomes by both distinguishing between “natural” and “corpo-
rate” persons and protecting the rights of religious individuals, will be
administrable by lower courts.
53. Id. at 2775 (majority opinion).
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55. Id. (emphasis added).
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A. The Corporation and the State in the Late Nineteenth and Early
Twentieth Centuries
In order to justify the test I am about to present, it is necessary for
me to outline the fundamental difference between “corporate persons”
and “natural persons,” vis–à–vis their relationship with the state, in
order to determine whether a claimed burden on religious exercise is
substantial in the case of the corporation.  In order to do this, I will
quickly outline the history of the ways in which the state has regulated
and controlled the corporate entity.  I will then argue that this estab-
lishes a very different baseline against which to measure the substantial-
ity of burdens imposed on corporations, as opposed to “natural
persons.”
The relationship between the corporation and the state has under-
gone remarkable change in the last century.56  Indeed, early examples
of corporations in earlier American history are hardly recognizable.
Consider, as an example, the 1837 case of Proprietors of Charles River
Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren:57 the case involved two corporations, each
created for the purpose of constructing bridges and collecting tolls.58
The process by which these corporations came about, however, likely
strikes the modern reader as wildly burdensome, if not downright
Byzantine.  In order for the companies to incorporate, the state legisla-
ture had to act through a legislative grant to bring the corporation into
being;59 not only that, but the grant incorporating the company was
specific and narrow in scope, outlining explicitly the activities in which
the corporation was to engage, which in this case was the specific pur-
pose of constructing bridges over two rivers.60  Such procedures were
the norm in the earlier history of the corporate entity; consider, for
example, the language from Dartmouth College v. Woodward:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and
existing only in contemplation of law.  Being the mere creature of
law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its crea-
tion confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
existence.  These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect
the object for which it was created.  Among the most important
are immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed, individual-
ity; properties, by which a perpetual succession of many persons
are considered as the same, and may act as a single individual.
They enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold
property, without the perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and
endless necessity, of perpetual conveyances for the purpose of
56. For a discussion of the history of the development of the corporation, see Greg-
ory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1441 (1987); see also Oscar Handlin & Mary F. Handlin, Origins of the American Busi-
ness Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1945).
57. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420
(1837).
58. Id. at 420.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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transmitting it from hand to hand.  It is chiefly for the purpose of
clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and
capacities, that corporations were invented, and are in use.61
So then, we can see that the corporation in the United States of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries62 was a much more restricted
entity, which required public action to bring about its existence, and
had a much narrower area within which to act; this illustrates the heavy-
handedness with which the state dealt with the corporate entity and the
great extent to which it regulated its existence.63
B. The Liberalization of the Corporation in the Twentieth Century
This rigorous creation and oversight regime, however, has largely
been replaced with a much more liberalized and accessible corporate
form; for instance, the Delaware General Corporation law states that
“[a]ny person, partnership, association or corporation . . . without
regard to such person’s or entity’s residence . . . may incorporate or
organize a corporation under this chapter by filing with . . . the Depart-
ment of State a certificate of incorporation”64 and “[a] corporation may
be incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or pro-
mote any lawful business or purpose[s].”65  The Delaware Code illus-
trates the ease of access to the corporate entity and the breadth this
access allows, which is a far cry from both the burdensome legislative
process which the state required and the limited scope this process
allowed in Charles River Bridge.  While the “cost of admission,” as it were,
is wildly lower than that which existed early in the history of the corpo-
rate entity, elaborate restrictions still mandate how the corporation
must be organized and the procedures it must follow in order to take
certain action.  For example, elaborate guidelines specify how the cor-
61. Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
62. The language of Dartmouth College defined the understanding of the corpora-
tion until the twentieth century.  Mark, supra note 56, at 1441 (“The Dartmouth College
decision defined the corporation for the American bar for much of the nineteenth
century”).
63. It is also interesting to note that, as originally conceived, the corporation was
envisioned as a vehicle to secure public goods, as opposed to merely private goods; so, it is
not merely the relationship between the state and the corporation that has changed, but
the end that the corporation is supposed to serve has also changed markedly by becoming
more privatized. Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 637–38 (“The objects for which a corpora-
tion is created are universally such as the government wishes to promote. They are
deemed beneficial to the country; and this benefit constitutes the consideration, and in
most cases, the sole consideration of the grant . . . . Charitable or public-spirited individu-
als, desirous of making permanent appropriations for charitable or other useful purposes,
find it impossible to affect their design securely and certainly, without an incorporating
act. They apply to the government, state their beneficent object, and offer to advance the
money necessary for its accomplishment, provided the government will confer on the
instrument which is to execute their designs the capacity to execute them. The proposi-
tion is considered and approved. The benefit to the public is considered as an ample
compensation for the faculty it confers, and the corporation is created.”).
64.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 101(a) (West 2016).  The following ways in which the
state regulates the corporation’s actions I reference below are also reflected, in large part,
by the Model Business Corporation Act.
65. § 101(b).
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poration shall be managed,66 set parameters for what can constitute
actions of the board,67 determine the circumstances under which cor-
porations may issue stock68 and dividends,69 and set parameters on the
operation of shareholder voting,70 to name a few instances.  The lan-
guage used to describe the corporate entity still reflects this reality that
the corporation does not exist a priori or pre-politically, but emerges
only a posteriori by operation of state power.71  From this, we can see
that while the restrictions imposed on corporations have indeed loos-
ened, the corporation is still, by virtue of being a statutory creation, a
derivative entity whose existence is marked at every step by limitations
imposed by the state.72
While this shift has eliminated, to a large extent, the premise that
the corporation is a unique construction that, because of the unique
advantages given to it and those running it, necessitates particularly
close government involvement in its continued operation, both the his-
tory of the corporation and the current state of the corporate regula-
tion illustrate that the corporation exists against a background of
pervasive regulation by the state, both of its existence and the actions it
takes, both internal and external.
66. § 141(a) (stating a board of directors shall manage the corporation); § 141(b)
(stating, among other provisions, that a) “[e]ach director shall hold office until such
director’s successor is elected and qualified or until such director’s earlier resignation or
removal,” b) requiring that a quorum of the Board require at least “1/3 . . . of the total
number of directors,” and c) requiring at least a vote of the majority of present Board
members constituting the quorum in order to constitute Board action).
67. See, e.g.,§ 141(b) (stating, among other provisions, that a) “[e]ach director shall
hold office until such director’s successor is elected and qualified or until such director’s
earlier resignation or removal,” b) requiring that a quorum of the Board require at least
“1/3 . . . of the total number of directors,” and c) requiring at least a vote of the majority
of present Board members constituting the quorum in order to constitute Board action).
68. See, e.g.,§ 151(a) (stating the ways in which corporations may issue stock and
how different types of stock may operate); § 153(a) (requiring stock be “issued for such
consideration having a value not less than the par value thereof” or not less than the set
value of no par stock).
69. See, e.g.,§ 170(a) (limiting the instances where dividends can be issued to
“either (1) out of [the corporation’s] surplus . . . or (2) in the case there shall be no
surplus, out of [the corporation’s] net profits for the fiscal year in which the dividend is
declared and/or the preceding fiscal year”); § 154 (defining the term “surplus” for pur-
poses of the issuance of dividends); § 173 (outlining the ways in which dividends may be
paid, and the procedure for issuing a stock dividend).
70. See, e.g.,§ 212(e) (detailing the proxy process for shareholder voting); § 213
(outlining procedures for setting dates to determine the shareholders of record); § 216
(requiring at least 1/3 of the shares entitled to vote to constitute a quorum).
71. For example, consider the language of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America:
“We think the Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the significance for Commerce
Clause analysis of the fact that state regulation of corporate governance is regulation of
entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law.”  461 U.S. 69, 89
(1987).
72. In fact, most law students spend at least an entire semester agonizing over the
ways in which a corporation may legally come into being and the ways in which it must
take certain actions.
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C. “Natural Persons,” the State, and Imposing Burdens
That the relationship between the citizen and the state is markedly
different than that between the corporation and the state may seem like
a fact so obvious that it does not merit stating.  However, in determin-
ing how best to analyze the Hobby Lobby-type cases, it is helpful to note
this obvious distinction between these two relationships and how the
disposition of prior cases reflects this reality.  This will be helpful in
illustrating the need for a different baseline against which to measure
burdens in the corporate context.
The fundamental baseline against which the individual operates is
markedly different than that against which the corporation operates.
With the individual, the baseline assumption is one of autonomy, and,
generally speaking, freedom from interference from that autonomy.
Instead of referencing founding-era political discourse or political phi-
losophy, this can be illustrated simply by cases which utilize language
that indicates how this understanding underlies the reasoning used to
adjudicate similar controversies brought before the Court.  For exam-
ple, in the Sherbert case, the Court held that by denying the appellant
unemployment benefits based on her refusal to work on Saturdays, the
government had imposed a substantial burden, “even though the bur-
den may [have been] characterized as being only indirect.”73  Here, we
can see the baseline in operation: because the plaintiff had to violate
her religious belief in order to receive the unemployment benefits, the
Court determined this to be “pressure upon her” equivalent to a “fine
imposed against appellant for her . . . worship.”74  What is most telling
is that the Court did not engage in any analysis of whether the pressure
or burden was sufficiently high; instead, once the burden was identi-
fied, the Court moved directly to the question of whether the state
could put forth a “compelling state interest.”75  This, I think, is intui-
tive, as our consciences collectively are unnerved by fines imposed on
religious worship, no matter how de minimis the sum of the fine may
be.  Additionally, consider Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark:76 City
of Newark was a post-Smith Free Exercise case (as RFRA had let to be
passed) involving a city police department order which banned the
growing of beards; two Muslim police officers challenged the rule as a
violation of their Free Exercise rights.77  The Court distinguished the
case from Smith,78 and, applying “intermediate scrutiny,”79 held the
73. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 403–07.  The Court only paused to consider, and refute, South Carolina’s
claim that the case was distinguishable from prior precedent because the appellant was
only denied a privilege and not a right.
76. Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999).  The
City of Newark opinion was written by then-Circuit Judge Samuel Alito.
77. Plaintiffs asserted that their religious beliefs (specifically the teachings of the
Sunni branch of Islam) required them to grow out their beards. Id. at 360–61.
78. The Court distinguished the case on the grounds that the fact that the police
department provided medical exemptions to the order (here medical exemptions) but
not religious exemptions, was “sufficiently suggestive of discriminatory intent so as to trig-
ger heightened scrutiny.” Id. at 365.
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order to be unconstitutional.80  Tellingly, whether or not the burden
imposed on the officers was substantial or not was not discussed by the
court and was not challenged by the police department.81  This, again, I
think is intuitive, and our collective understanding of religious freedom
does not need a justification for the substantiality of the burden.  While
the argument could have been made that the officers could simply have
chosen another profession, to deny access to a public career, especially
one which is both a service and a profession, on the basis of religion is
intuitively objectionable, regardless of whether other jobs or profes-
sions were accessible to the officers.  Any argument that the officers
could have simply worked in another field is a non-starter.  These intu-
itions are understandable as logical conclusions of the proposition that
the relationship between the individual and the state, in particular in
matters of religion and religious practice, is one of non-interference,
and to deny access to any good which is otherwise publically available
on the basis of religion is an unjust imposition on the individual.  This
baseline against which the burdens asserted by plaintiffs does not strike
one as exceptionally high,82 especially in light of both the majority and
dissenting opinions in Hobby Lobby.83
Based on this, it is simply nonsensical to use the same baseline
analysis for burdens, because the individual and the corporation, in
philosophical, historical, and practical legal terms, exist against com-
pletely different backgrounds vis-à-vis the government.  Therefore, a
separate analysis for burdens is necessary for corporations.  But how is
this to be done?
D. Analyzing Religious Burdens in the Corporate Context
I should begin by noting that I will not be considering the implica-
tion of my test in the case of for-profit corporations.  As Justice Alito
noted, “it seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants . . . will often
79. The Court explained its rationale for applying intermediate, as opposed to
strict, scrutiny as follows: “[w]hile Smith and Lukumi speak in terms of strict scrutiny when
discussing the requirements for making distinctions between religious and secular exemp-
tions, we will assume that an intermediate level of scrutiny applies since this case arose in
the public employment context and since the Department’s actions cannot survive even
that level of scrutiny” (citations omitted). Id. at 366, n.7.
80. Id. at 364–367.
81. After determining that heightened scrutiny applied, the Court moved directly
to the question of whether the police department could offer any justification to survive
that standard. Id. at 366.
82. For other examples of post-Smith Free Exercise cases with similar outcomes, see
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); see also Gonza-
les v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
83. For example, consider that the majority listed the total sums involved for the
corporations before deeming the burden to be substantial.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2775–76 (2014); likewise, the dissenting opinion stated that the
“families’ religious objections and the contraceptive coverage requirement is too attenu-
ated” to support the RFRA claim. Id. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).  This is indicative
of the fact that, while the Court did not articulate upon the distinctions between the
burden analyses for corporations and “natural persons,” there was at least an acknowledg-
ment that a greater, or at least different, justification was needed.
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assert RFRA claims.”84  This is intuitively true: it would simply not work
out in practice that a large, publicly traded corporation would be either
willing or able to assert a RFRA claim, for obvious reasons.  For exam-
ple, it is hard to imagine that a publicly traded corporation would ever
have any kind of statement like the Hahns’ “Vision and Values State-
ments”85 in the Hobby Lobby case or that a group in control of such a
company would choose a publicly-traded company if the maintenance
of such a creedo was of such importance to them.  Finally, it just seems
implausible that a large corporation, with a board of directors from
various backgrounds and shareholders of varying power with differing
views, would ever be able to bring a RFRA claim, even if somehow the
above conditions were met, because the likelihood of the board mem-
bers and relevant shareholders all supporting such a decision seems
incredibly unlikely, if not flatly impossible.86
The test for whether a corporation’s “religious exercise” has been
burdened requires a more nuanced approach, for, as I outlined above,
the baseline against which the corporation exists vis-à-vis the govern-
ment, with regards to regulatory activity, is simply incongruous with that
of the natural person.  Because the corporation, albeit to a lesser extent
than in the 19th and early 20th centuries, is still a product of the state
via legislative act and comes into existence against the background of
extensive regulation, it does not make sense to treat burdens placed on
corporations as analytically the same as burdens placed on “natural per-
sons.”  Therefore, any test used to address this question must both
reflect the reality of the corporate entity and provide this analytic clar-
ity.  Because of the reality of intense regulation against which the corpo-
ration comes into being, it simply cannot be the case that the analysis
turns on pure economic burden, as the baseline of corporate activity is
one of an imposition of burdens, generally speaking—i.e., the corpora-
tion, by its very nature, has limits on how it can be structured.87
For example, the state collects fees when the corporation is regis-
tered, taxes it in a unique way, and has a myriad of law mandating how
it can and can’t act.  As I mentioned above, there are limitations on
how the corporation is to be managed and how that management is to
be structured, how stock may be issued and dividends paid out, and
how voting procedures are to operate.88  Therefore, when the persons
in control of the corporation claim that there is a burden being
imposed on them via a fine to the corporation, this should not be a
sufficient condition for such plaintiffs to proceed with a RFRA claim,
even if the fine is substantial in the aggregate, because the state makes
84. Id. at 2774.
85. Id. at 2764.
86. Not to mention, the public opinion backlash that the corporation would have
to handle.  For an interesting discussion on the intersection between Hobby Lobby, share-
holder activism, and social causes, see Michele Benedetto Neitz, Hobby Lobby and Social
Justice: How the Supreme Court Opened the Door for Socially Conscious Investors, 68 S.M.U. L.
REV. 243 (2015).
87. See supra notes 66–70.
88. See supra notes 65–71.
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all sorts of fundamental action more difficult for the corporation, and
the fundamental relationship of the state vis-à-vis the corporation is one
of imposing burdens on its activity.  All of these burdens imposed are
tradeoffs for the protection of personal assets that the corporation
allows people to achieve.  The Hobby Lobby Court seems to have had an
intuition about this reality, as the majority opinion noted that the fines
imposed on the corporations totaled in the millions.89  Compare this to
Sherbert, where the total amount of the burden (which the Court noted
functioned as a fine) was not mentioned; it was sufficient that the state
had imposed a fine on the plaintiff’s religious activity, irrespective of
the amount of the fine.90  With this in mind, it becomes clear that the
burden imposed on the corporation must be analyzed against this
understanding of an increased baseline for government interference
and direction.  Instead of simple economic analysis, which is ultimately
unhelpful in determining whether any burden imposed can truly be
deemed substantial (since a larger corporation will always equal a bigger
imposition in terms of the total cash sum), the emphasis should instead
be on the burden (still in terms of the economic cost, i.e. the fines
associated with non-compliance) viewed in relation to the other burdens
that are placed on the corporation.
But what does this mean, precisely?  In other words, because the
basic relationship between the state and the corporation is one of
imposing burdens (as the “payoff” for individuals utilizing the advan-
tages of the corporate structure), a substantial burden is one which so
increases the costs of utilizing the corporate structure such that either
(a) it is cost prohibitive for the persons controlling the corporation to
continue to use the corporate structure or (b) to continue to operate as
a corporation, the firm would have to undergo a fundamental transfor-
mation or reorganization in order to remain a viable firm.  Simply put,
this aspect of the test serves to ensure that people are not excluded
from a valuable public good—viz. the corporate structure—simply
because they hold religious beliefs that do not align with popular ortho-
doxy and go against the current cultural and political zeitgeist.  Because
corporate rights exist to protect individual rights, a religious burden
should become substantial under RFRA if it excludes the individual for
utilizing a publicly-created good: the corporate entity.  The advantage
of this approach is that it prevents potential obfuscation by giving sub-
stance to the substantiality requirement that the plaintiff asserts.
Some might object that the approach I have so far laid out above
appears to be nothing more than “[p]ure applesauce”91 or, worse yet,
“legalistic argle-bargle.”92  However, I hope that, by outlining a three-
89. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775.
90. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403–04 (1963).
91. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2501 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  I,
along with many other current and future members of the legal profession, am eternally
indebted to the late Justice Scalia.  His towering intellect, humor, and exceptional rhetor-
ical flair both fueled my desire to engage with the most difficult of legal issues and chal-
lenged the way I understood the role of the judiciary in the United States.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\31-2\NDE206.txt unknown Seq: 18 13-JUL-17 11:59
426 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 31
part test, the approach for which I am advocating will not only be reflec-
tive of the reality of the corporate entity, but also be administrable for
lower courts hearing the vast majority of these cases, so that they will
not be left to flounder with an un-administrable test, but will instead be
able to present conclusions both consistent with precedent and possess-
ing an analytic clarity that is becoming of a federal court of law.  In
addition to ensuring that cases are rightfully decided, it is also impor-
tant, especially because of the divisive nature of these cases, to ensure
that the reasoning underlying the decisions is seen as legitimate and
not seen as simply the product of judicial discretion or disguised politi-
cal preferences.  In order to determine whether the government has in
fact imposed a substantial burden on the person in question in Hobby
Lobby-like cases, namely the “corporate person,” I propose the following
three-part test.
First, there must be an assertion of a burden on the corporation
asserted by plaintiffs.  This means, quite simply, that the plaintiffs make
an assertion of a religious belief involved.  In the context of the closely-
held corporation, this means (a) identifying a religious belief held by
the plaintiffs bringing the claim and (b) articulating how the regulation
in question compels the violation of that belief.  This, admittedly, is not
a factor of any significant weight.  It will not function, in any real way, to
limit the number of claimants who would be able to press such a claim
under RFRA, excepting only the most extreme circumstances where a
plaintiff would simply be unable to articulate the claimed burden at all.
However, it is the necessary first step to establish the rest of the analysis.
Second, the court must determine whether the corporation is
being forced to act in a way inconsistent with the belief asserted in the
first part of the test.  Here, the court must determine if the religious
belief identified in the first part of the test impacts the operations of the
corporation.  In other words, the court must determine if the corpora-
tion is, in fact, being forced to act in a way inconsistent with the asserted
belief, as opposed to the individual plaintiffs.  This, again, is not a rigor-
ous test to pass, and a simple showing that the corporation’s activities
do facilitate the objected activity at issue will suffice.  The function of
this part of the test is to move the religious beliefs of the individual
plaintiffs to the “person” to which the plaintiffs are seeking to apply the
RFRA protection: the corporation.  In making this move, the subse-
quent analysis will be freed from the confusion between persons I previ-
ously outlined.  It addresses, to an extent, the concerns raised by Justice
Ginsburg in her Hobby Lobby dissent about the causal link between the
belief claimed by the plaintiffs and the actions taken by the corpora-
tion93 by ensuring that there is a connection between the belief
asserted and the actions of the corporation.  By taking such an
approach, this test avoids the dual pitfalls of forsaking any causal analy-
sis at all, while simultaneously not getting into the business of determin-
93. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct., at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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ing “whether the religious belief asserted . . . is reasonable,”94 which is
an issue that “the federal courts have no business addressing.”95
Now that the beliefs asserted have been properly “shifted” to the
corporation, we can move to the final part of the test: most importantly,
the court must determine if the burden imposed is substantial.  This is
the central aspect of the test, which, as I conceive it operating, will be
the dispositive question in determining the outcomes of cases.  The sub-
stantiality of the burden imposed on the corporation is analyzed by
looking at the cost imposed relative to other impositions on the corpo-
ration—both qualitatively and quantitatively; this mode of analysis fol-
lows from the above discussion on the differences between corporations
and individuals vis-à-vis the state: because the baseline against which
government interference is far higher in the case of corporations, it
simply does not make sense to measure religious burdens the same way
as they are measured in the individual context, where the baseline for
government interference with religious practice was effectively zero.
Therefore, a burden becomes substantial in this context when it does
not simply interfere with the corporation’s belief, but only when that
interference threatens the integrity of the corporation.  In order to
measure this, the first step for the court would be to simply compare
the total amount the burden would cost the corporation against the
corporation’s revenue for the previous year.  This approach has the
benefit of simplicity, and it would allow the court to determine if the
imposed burden threatens the integrity of the corporation to the extent
that the plaintiffs are threatened with an alteration of their business as a
result, or worse, with the prospect of having to abandon their enter-
prises altogether.  A second step to further clarify the substantiality of a
burden would be to compare the burden imposed against other bur-
dens that the state imposes, such as taxes on taxable income.  Such an
analysis would illustrate the extent to which the state is imposing not
merely an additional requirement similar to those it imposes on all cor-
porations, but is imposing an entirely new burden on religiously moti-
vated corporations, specifically.  For example, imagine a corporation is
being effectively taxed at 33% of taxable income, and the state imposes
a burden that accounts for 11% of revenue as a result of the owners of
the corporation objecting on religious grounds to some obligation
imposed on the corporation.  Such a burden would effectively be the
equivalent of a 33% tax increase, as the revenues of the corporation are
reduced by an additional one-third of what it already has taken away
through taxation.96  Such a burden would obviously be substantial, as
the state has effectively placed religiously motivated corporations into a
higher tax bracket than similarly situated corporations.  Ultimately, the
question that is asked by the court at this stage of the analysis is the
following: Is the burden being imposed on the corporation such that it
forces the plaintiffs to choose between either, on the one hand, capitu-
94. Id. at 2778.
95. Id.
96. (Eleven percent of total revenue divided by 33% taxation on taxable income).
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lating to the demands of the state, against their consciences, or, on the
other, abandoning the corporate structure altogether (as the burden
imposed on the business threatens the corporation’s financial integrity
and presents the possibility of plaintiffs having to abandon their enter-
prise altogether)?  If the answer to that question is yes, then the burden
being imposed on the corporation is a substantial burden.
E. Application of the Test
Applying this test to the Hobby Lobby decision (and other scenarios
that will soon be before the court) will allow us to answer the all-impor-
tant question: Is there anything to be gained by utilizing this test in
these cases?  In the case of Hobby Lobby, the first and second aspects of
the test would be easily met: the Hahns and Greens each articulated
religious beliefs about conception, life, and abortion; furthermore, they
illustrated how the activity demanded of their corporation infringed on
those beliefs by the provision of certain drugs through the mandated
health care coverage, which they viewed as enabling abortion.97  With
respect to the substantiality of the burden, the claim would also suc-
ceed: using the first approach, the fines imposed on Hobby Lobby
would have constituted nearly 13% of total revenues for 2014.98The sec-
ond approach would emphasize the substantiality of the burden: while
the financials for Hobby Lobby are not available, assuming that it is
taxed at 35% on taxable income, such a burden would be the practical
equivalent of a roughly 37% tax increase.99  The application of the test
produces an intuitively just result: 13% of total revenue is a substantially
large sum that effectively puts it in a higher tax bracket and would cer-
tainly force Hobby Lobby to restructure itself in order to offset those
losses.100
As I believe I have shown above, this approach would be superior
to what I’ve called the “simple economic approach,” because such an
approach obfuscates the simple reality that the most ordinary demands
the state places on the corporation  command the corporation to hand
over fantastic sums to the state.  For this reason, we cannot simply look
at the naked burden being imposed on corporations in RFRA cases,
because any monthly or yearly quantity will look massive if the corpora-
tion is large enough.  By looking at the burden in terms of raw aggrega-
tions of cash, Hobby Lobby seems to ensure that large enough
corporations will always have burdens imposed upon them if the per-
sons in control simply claim an objection on religious grounds.  The
97. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2764–66.
98. (Four hundred seventy-five million dollars per year divided by $3.7 billion in
total revenue for 2014). See id., at 2775–76; America’s Largest Private Companies: #118 Hobby
Lobby Stores, FORBES (2014), http://www.forbes.com/companies/hobby-lobby-stores/.
99. Thirteen percent of total revenue divided by 35% taxation on taxable income.
100. Furthermore, even if these costs were offset by Hobby Lobby foregoing insur-
ance altogether, such a position would seriously hamstring the corporation’s ability to
hire and maintain employees, which, obviously, would put the corporation at a serious
competitive disadvantage, resulting in the same dilemma. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at
2776–77.
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approach I advocate avoids this by requiring not merely that the sums
imposed on the corporation are large, but are large with respect to the
burdens the state already imposes on its operation.  Utilizing this
approach, I believe future cases of the Hobby Lobby-type will not only be
more just by reflecting the reality of the corporate entity, but will also
garner more legitimacy as precedent by eliminating the analytical gap
in the Hobby Lobby opinion, thus foreclosing the “have your cake and eat
it too” argument against the type of burden analysis used in Hobby Lobby.
CONCLUSION
This test will likely not do much to reduce the fervor which accom-
panies the Hobby Lobby case and other potential and pending cases, such
as the upcoming Little Sisters of the Poor case or the case involving Whea-
ton College, currently in the lower courts.101  However, I believe that it
would have the effect of providing analytical clarity to such cases by
distinguishing between the protections afforded to “natural persons”
and those afforded to “corporate persons,” which serve the function of
protecting real people.  This, I hope, will quell some of the frustration
over the Hobby Lobby case—namely, that the plaintiffs in that case are
having it both ways by taking advantage of the separation afforded to
them by the corporate entity, yet then leveraging their own personal
religious objections through that same form in order to avoid the provi-
sions of the ACA which were offensive to their religious sensibilities.102
This test was constructed, in large part, to solve this analytic inconsis-
tency in a way that both protects the rights of real people, while also
preventing the kinds of abuses foreseen by those who have challenged
the Hobby Lobby decision on these grounds.  As I outlined above, I do
not see this test, as I envision it, as altering the ultimate outcome of the
Hobby Lobby decision.  What I hope to achieve is not a method which will
produce a different result, but one that not only applies RFRA to the
“corporate person” with analytic consistency and reflects the history of
the corporate entity and its relationship to the state, but also provides
an analytic framework with which lower courts can adjudicate cases.
The latter end at which this test aims is important in securing two
related benefits: first, by giving lower courts the clarity that accompa-
nies a consistent logic, decisions by lower courts will be more easily
made by judges striving to dispose of cases in a manner faithful to both
law and precedent,103 and second, both corporations subject to regula-
101. Supra note 51.
102. While the situation of the closely-held corporation is admittedly much differ-
ent than that of the run-of-the-mill publicly-traded corporation, the objection still, in my
view, holds water, as the effect of the corporate structure is still to create legal division
between the persons controlling the corporation and the corporation (especially in the
case of assets).  This essential division is operating the same way in the closely-held scena-
rio as it is in the publicly-traded context.
103. I also hope that this test, by producing decisions that possess a more consistent
internal logic, will engender a greater respect for the rule of law and also temper the
inclination to see the results in such cases as the mere operation of ideological struggle,
although I fear that the latter goal might be permanently out of reach.
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tory schemes that could potentially conflict with the protections
afforded by RFRA and regulatory agencies who promulgate and admin-
ister  such regulatory schemes will gain much needed clarity about what
protections are afforded to them, in the case of the corporation, and
how far any regulatory scheme can go before it runs afoul of the protec-
tions afforded to regulated parties, in the case of the regulatory agen-
cies.  The attainment of these two ends will, I hope, both engender a
greater respect for the rule of law generally speaking and also reduce
the need to litigate that arises from uncertainty.
Inevitably, there will be those who simply refuse to accept the
objections of the type made by the Hahns and the Greens in the Hobby
Lobby case and will view legal stances, and even, I fear, people them-
selves, sympathetic to such objections as anachronistic at best and posi-
tively oppressive at worse.  Some have argued that it is RFRA itself that is
the problem.104  Perhaps it is the case that we as a society will in the
future decide that we ought not to extend the type of protection
afforded by RFRA and similar state statutes.  However, if one has a seri-
ous commitment to religious liberty and to constitutional protections
generally, this necessitates, at the very least, tolerating the fact that peo-
ple who hold views we despise are not prohibited from engaging mean-
ingfully in society, and to refuse those people with whom we disagree
access to the goods made publicly available is to betray the commitment
to meaningful and robust pluralism that embodies the foundations of
our society and that of Western liberal democratic society generally.
104. See Louise Melling, Opinion, ACLU: Why We can no Longer Support the Federal
‘Religious Freedom’ Law, WASH. POST (June 25, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/congress-should-amend-the-abused-religious-freedom-restoration-act/2015/06/
25/ee6aaa46-19d8-11e5-ab92-c75ae6ab94b5_story.html.
